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AGRICULTURAL LANDS, FERTILE SOILS, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY, THE TRUST DOCTRINE,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
AND THE NATURAL LAW
VICTOR JOHN YANNACONE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Preservation of the agricultural productivity of the Class I, Class
II, and Class III soils1 of the United States is one of those unenu-
merated rights retained by the sovereign People of the United States
in the ninth amendment, 2 and entitled to protection under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fifth amendment 3 and
the rights, privileges and immunities, due process, and equal pro-
tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
4
The unique and irreplaceable prime agricultural lands5 of this
country represent a national, natural resource treasure so vested
* Yannacone & Yannacone, Potchogue, N.Y. LL.B., 1959, Brooklyn School of Law.
The author was co-founder of the Environmental Defense Fund and their counsel until 1969.
1. Soils are classified and named, in much the same manner as are plants and animals.
Soils are identified by such characteristics as the kinds and numbers of horizons, or layers,
that have developed in them; the texture, which is determined by the relative amounts of
stones, gravel, sand, silt and clay; the kinds and amounts of minerals present; and the
presence of salts and alkali.
The type is the smallest unit in the natural classification of soils. One or more types con-
stitute a soil series. These are the common classification units seen on soil maps and soil
survey reports. The names of the soil series are taken from the towns or localities near
the place where the soils were first defined. Higher units in the classification system in-
clude families, great soil groups, suborders, and orders.
Soil series, types and phases do not occur at random in the landscape. They have an or-
derly pattern of occurrence that is related to the land form, the parent material from which
the soil was formed, and the influence of the plants that grew from the soils, the animals
that lived on them, and the way mankind has used them.
Soils may be grouped into land capability classes, subclasses, and units. The Soil Conser-
vation Service of the United States Department of Agriculture has established eight soil
classes based upon the suitability of the land for farming purposes. Class I, Class II and
Class III soils form the basis for most of the arable land in the continental United States
and Canada, although a limited amount of Class IV land can be cultivated on an intermit-
tent yield basis provided rigorous soil conservation measures are applied.
Soils, climate and vegetation are intimately related and these relationships vary with time.
Soils are designated young, middle-aged, mature or old depending upon the length of time
that has elapsed since the soil-forming process began.
Plant growth is affected by a number of factors. The most important climatic factors are
sunshine, length of day and season, temperature and precipitation. Atmospheric composi-
tion and movement are also involved. Crops grow best in a climate similar to that in
which they originally evolved, or have become adapted to, whether naturally or through
human effort. Man, by his ability to alter, in part, the properties of the soil, regulate the
processes that take place within it, as well as control insects, diseases, and weeds that
interfere with the growth of crops, is by far the most important biotic factor affecting
plant growth.
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with the public interest that they have become a public trust re-
quiring those who might be the nominal "owners" of such lands at
this time to assume the role of faithful stewards and guardians of
this priceless and limited gift of nature.
There can be little doubt that courts of equity soon will be call-
ed upon to protect prime agricultural lands from the threat of thigh
density, residential subdivision housing development along the East-
ern Coastal Plain and in the Great Valleys of the West, or from
stripping to reach coal and lignite deposits in the Central United
States.
Imposing the public trust on prime agricultural land throughout
the United States, just as many of the other major changes in the
-evolution of American social and political policy, will probably re-
quire fundamental constitutional litigation and action in Congress
and the state legislatures. The Anglo-American adversary system of
litigation since Magna Charta has become civilization's alternative
to revolution, and once again it appears that the courtroom will be
the arena where the conscience of America will initially sort its
values and establish its real priorities. In this generation the issues
will be energy, environment, land use and resource consumption.
At the dawn of civilization, when mankind awoke to the world
away from the tree and outside the cave, soil and water became
important human concerns. The ancient Hebrew people maintained
that God made man from, and ordained that man shall eventually
return to, affar, which means, literally, the material of the soil.6
Throughout all of history, a substantial portion of the people on
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE (1957); U.S. DEP"I
OF AGRICULTURE, 2/3 OF OUR LAND: A NATIONAL INVENTORY (Program Aid No. 984 1971.) ;
Bear, Highly Productive Lands of North America, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH
AMERICA 136 (Darling & Milton eds. 1966).
2. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
3. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when In actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend V.
4. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are, citizens of the United States and the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within Its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See generally Russeu, Physical Properties, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, YEAR3OOK OF
AGRICULTURE 31-38 (1957).
6. D. ILLEL, SOIL AND WATER, PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES 1 (1971).
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earth have been underfed and undernourished, and in spite of the
"Green Revolution,"' 7 they still are, assuring that the lifelong effects
of malnutrition will provide the worldwide social and political prob-
lems for each succeeding generation. It is becoming increasingly
evident that today, no less than in ancient times, the ultimate sur-
vival of mankind depends upon preserving the soil-water system of
the earth for the production of food.
The early Greek philosophers identified four elements as basic
in the natural world: soil, water, fire and air; and now, more than
two thousand years later, we are beginning to realize that energy,
air, soil and water are the basic life support systems of spaceship
earth.
The social lesson of soil waste is that no man has the
right to destroy soil even if he does own it in fee simple.
The soil requires a duty of man which we have been slow
to recognize.8
Nevertheless, in the frantic haste to supply a wastrel society
with cheap energy as an alternative to energy conservation, we are
preparing to strip the precious and essentially irreplaceable topsoil
from more than a million acres of prime agricultural land in North
Dakota to reach a thin layer of lignite, a low grade fuel that will
be exhausted in less than 50 years.9 Just as we stripped the prime
agricultural lands of the Eastern Coastal Plain and the Great Valleys
of California so that every family could have a federally subsidized
single family home in suburbia and commute to work in the city.
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
A. WHO OWNS THE FERTILE SOIL?
The earth and its natural resources are the fundamental capital
assets of civilization. In the United States, all the powers over land
and natural resources once held by the Kings of England, France
or Spain are now held by the sovereign people of the United States,
collectively. They are exercised, by permission of the people, by
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the federal govern-
ment and the governments of the several states. In the United States,
government acts as the agent or trustee of the power of the people,
for the benefit of all the people.
7. Hambridge, Soils and Men-Summary, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, YEARBOOK OF
AGRICULTURE 3-4 (1957).
8. Wallace, Foreword to U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE
(1938).
9. Hubbert, Energy Resources, in THE ENERGY CRISIS: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 105
(V. Yannacone, Jr., ed. 1974).
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The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people. 10
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.11
Under the Constitution, the rights of individual property owners
were strengthened, but at no time did the sovereign people of the
United States relinquish their collective right to determine the high-
est and best use of land and natural resources. Neither did the
people of the individual states relinquish their collective right to pro-
vide for the common good within each state and insist, on behalf
of all the people, not only of this generation, but of those generations
yet unborn, that land be used according to its intrinsic suitability
rather than as merely a substrate for development.
If the people of this generation are to use wisely that which
has been left by preceding generations, certain assumptions must
be made with respect to land and consumable natural resources:
1. Development of land and consumption of natural re-
sources is, to some extent, inevitable.
2. We must accommodate land use and natural resource
consumption to the extent necessary to advance those as-
pects of civilization that nurture the development and evolu-
tion of those uniquely human characteristics which transcend
the mere biological heritage of mankind.
3. Land use and resource consumption must be limited by
natural constraints imposed by natural processes.
4. Planned growth toward the highest and best use of land
and natural resources is more profitable to the human com-
munity in any regional ecological system than unplanned
growth.
5. The police power of the State, the ultimate sovereignty of
the people and traditional private property rights are com-
patible concepts which can mutually assure the beneficial
development of land and the wise use of natural resources.
The legal justification for any limitation on the use of private
property in the United States is founded on the belief that the people
of the United States are the sovereign, collectively, not in the person
of any elected official or appointed bureaucrat.
B. WHO IS THE SOVEREIGN?
In 1793,12 the Supreme Court of the United States was called
upon to consider the nature of sovereignty in the United States. Mr.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
618
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Justice Wilson took the position that the term "sovereign" was un-
known to the Constitution of the United States.
[T]he term sovereign has for its correlative, subject. In
this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has
no object in the Constitution of the United States. Under that
constitution, there are citizens, but no subjects.
[T]he people. . . of the United States. . . have reserved
the supreme power in their own hands; and on that supreme
power, have made the [government] dependent, instead
of being sovereign .... 13
Mr. Justice Wilson believed that despotic governments resulted
from the attribution of sovereignty to one man or institution.
Even in almost every nation which has been denominated
free, the state has assumed a supercilious pre-eminence
above the people who have formed it; hence, the haughty
notions of state independence, state sovereignty, and state
supremacy. In despotic governments, the government has
usurped, in a similar manner, both upon the state and the
peopIe; hence all arbitrary doctrines and pretensions concern-
ing the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power of gov-
ernment. In each, man is degraded from the prime rank
which he ought to hold in human affairs ... 14
Pointing out that in England, the sovereignty had been described
as being in Parliament, with the people ignored, the very model
of despotic government.
Another instance, equally strong, but still more astonishing,
is drawn from the British government, as described by Sir
William Blackstone and his followers. As described by him
and them, the British is a despotic government. It is a gov-
ernment, as so described, the sovereignty is possessed by
the parliament; in the parliament, therefore, the supreme
and absolute authority is vested: (a) in the parliament re-
sides that uncontrollable and despotic power, which, in all
governments, must reside somewhere. The constituent parts
of the parliament are the King's Majesty, the Lord's spirit-
ual, the Lord's temporal, and the Commons. The King and
these three states together form the great corporation of body
politic of the kingdom. All these sentiments are found; the
last expressions are found verbatim, (b) in the Commen-
taries upon the Laws of England. (c) The parliament form
the great body politic of England! What, then, or where, are
the people? Nothing! No where! They are not so much as
even the "baseless fabric of a vision!" From legal contem-
plation, they totally disappear! Am I not warranted in say-
ing that, if this is just description, a government, so and
justly so described, is a despotic government? 15
13. Id. at 455-57.
14. Id. at 460.
15. Id. at 462.
619
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Chief Justice Jay also recognized the people of the United States,
not the federal government, as the sovereign:
From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their
country passed to the people of it. . . . [T]he people, in
their collective and national capacity . . . established the
present constitution. It is remarkable that in establishing it,
the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper
sovereignty, and conscious of the plentitude of it, they de-
clared with becoming dignity, "We the people of the United
States, do ordain and establish this constitution." Here we
see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole coun-
try....o
[Tihe sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the
nation....
Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or state sover-
eign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Eur-
ope, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here
it rests with the people. . . Their princes have personal
powers, dignities and pre-eminences, our rulers have none
but official; nor do they partake in the sovereignty other-
wise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.11
There is no mistaking the fact that the majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States, just five years after the Constitution was
ratified, rejected the idea that the United States government or any
of its officials were the "sovereign." The people of the United States
were the sovereign!
A century later, in 1882,17 the Supreme Court again considered
the issue of sovereignty; this time in the context of whether "sover-
eign immunity" could be raised as a defense by the federal govern-
ment or any of its officers in actions brought against them by
citizens of the United States of America.
Under our system the people, who are there called sub-
jects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or
individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of
loyalty to the person of a monarch. The citizen here knows
no person, however near to those in power, or however pow-
erful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which the
law secures to him when it is well administered. When he,
in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has established
his right to property, there is no reason why deference to
any person, natural or artificial, not even the United States,
should prevent him from using the means which the law gives
him for the protection and enforcement of that right. 8
16. Id. at 470-71.
17. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).




A. THE TRUST DOCTRINE 19
Under certain circumstances, either because it is unique and ir-
replaceable or because it is of such special significance to the people
that any use incompatable with the long term good of society be-
comes unconscionable, real property becomes vested with the public
interest and subject to the public trust.
In the case of a national, natural resource treasure such as the
limited supply of prime agricultural land in the United States, a
court of equity can act to protect the public interest in the property
even if it means limiting the rights of the nominal "owner." Equity
can be called upon to protect the rights of the sovereign people of
the United States in and to the benefit, use, and enjoyment of prop-
erty vested with the public interest long after it has come into pri-
vate ownership.20 Prime agricultural land and the arable soils of
this nation have become so important to the welfare of the people
of this generation and those generations yet unborn that they are
bested with sufficient public interest to impose the obligations of a
trustee for the public benefit upon the nominal owners.
As early as the fourth and third centuries B.C., the Romans
acknowledged the existence of public lands and common lands held
by the state for the benefit, use and enjoyment of the people.2 1 The
fact that a public interest in land was accepted at such an early
stage of Western Civilization supports the contention that however
vague the form or poorly defined the principle, there was recognition
of the "trust doctrine."
During the Middle Ages, the influence of Rome and its laws
diminished throughout large areas of western Europe, but regardless
of whatever devious route it took, the Roman law and its concept
of a public trust eventually became a part of the English common
law.
With but little acknowledged interaction, these two great systems
of jurisprudence recognized the concept of a public trust impossible
on property otherwise subject to private ownership, providing a mul-
ticultural dimension to the "trust doctrine" and illuminating its na-
tural law heritage.
22
19. For a general discussion of the trust doctrine in environmental law, see 1 V. YANNA-
CONE, JR., B. COHEN, & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES § 2 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES].
20. Id.
21. During the first century B.C., Gracchus attempted to institute agrarian reforms
which relied heavily upon the redistribution of public lands among the peasants, and his
limited success can, In large measure, be attributed to the fact that there was a
general acceptance by all Romans of the idea that some land was held, In trust for all
the people.
22. But for the concept of natural law, the local laws of a small peasant community of
peninsular Italy would never have become the universal law of an International civiliza-
622 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
While the fertility of the earth was known to be affected by
human activities since ancient times, and mankind was early recog-
nized as the guardian of the earth and steward of its resources,
eventually, the deep concern of John Locke and other political phil-
osophers with private property rights overpowered the admonitions
of the Bible, 23 the ethics of the Greeks24 and the reasoning of the
early philosophers, 25 leading succeeding generations to ignore the
public trust in land and natural resources.
Locke's shortsightedness is evidenced by his naive reasoning that
there would always be enough left over for others.
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land by improv-
ing it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still
enough and as good left, and more than the yet unprovided
could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left
for others because of his enclosure for himself. For he that
leaves as much as another can make use of those as good
as take nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured
by the drinking of another man, though he took a good
draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him
to quench his thirst. And the case of land and water, where
there i's enough of both, is perfectly the same.... [God] gave
it [the world] to the use of the industrious and rational
(and labour was to be his title to it);. . . [T]he same
tion. "But for natural law the great medieval synthesis of godly and of worldly wisdom
would not have been possible. But for natural law there would have been no American and
no French Revolution, nor would the great ideals of freedom and equality have found
their way into the law-books after having found it into the hearts of men." A. d'ENTREvE9,
NATURAL LAW (1970). See also 0. GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SocIETY
(1950).
23. "Therefore you shall do my statutes, and keep my ordinances and perform them;
so you will dwell in the land securely. The land will yield its fruit, and you will eat your
fill, and dwell in it securely. . . . The land shall not be sold in perpetuity for the land is
mine; for you are strangers and sojourners with me." Leviticus 25:18-23 (RSV).
"But the fields of common land belonging to their cities may not be sold; for that
is their perpetual possession." Leviticus 25:34 (RSV).
"You shall not defile the land in which you live, in the midst of which I dwell; for
i the Lord dwell in the midst of the people of Israel." Numbers 35:34 (RSV).
"But ask the beasts, and they will teach you; the birds of the air, and they will
tell you; or the plants of the earth, and they will teach you; and the fish of the sea will
declare to you.
Who among all these does not know that the hand of the Lord has done this?
In his hand is the life of every living thing and the breath of all mankind." Job
12:7-10 (RSV).
In Deuteronomy 11:12-18, the Israelites are reminded of the great value of the
land and the first chapter of the book of Joel mourns the desolation largely resulting from
the failure of the Israelites to respect the ancient rules of land tenure and, management
handed down from their ancient oral tradition.
"(T]he water brooks are dried up, and the fire has devoured the pastures of the
wilderness." Joel 1:20 (RSV).
24. "[W]hen many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or moun-
tain torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend to take care that the confluent waters
should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and di-
vert impurities, ..." PLATO, V DIALOGUES OF PLATO, LAWS 118 (B. Jowett ed. 1892).
25. "[Alnd from this followeth another law: That such things as cannot be divided be
enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint;
otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have Right." Hobbes, Of Man, in
Leviathan 119 (1909).
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measure may be allowed still, without prejudice to anybody,
full as the world seems. . . . We shall be allowed still, with-
out prejudice to anybody, full as the world seems. . . . We
shall find that the possessions he could make himself upon
the measure we have given, would not be very large, nor,
even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind or give them
reason to complain or think themselves injured by this man's
encroachment, though the race of men have now spread
themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely
exceed the small number there was at the beginning.
2 6
But, in 1909, the National Conservation Commission established
by President Theodore Roosevelt recommended that:
The resources which have required ages for their accumu-
lation, to the intrinsic value and quantity of which human
agency has not contributed, which there are no known sub-
stitutes, must serve the welfare of the Nation. In the highest
sense, therefore, they should be regarded as property held
in trust for the use of the race rather than for a single gen-
eration and for the use of the Nation, rather than for the
benefit of a few individuals who may hold them by right of
discovery or by purchase.
2 7
The conclusion marked a Twentieth Century return to the "trust
doctrine."
B. THE COMMON LAW OF DEDICATION
Judicial declaration of the rights and interest of the people in
and to the benefit, use and enjoyment of certain property was not
unknown at common law, which often saw a court declaring the
public right to privately held lands.2- Under the common law of
dedication, once land has been dedicated to the use of the public,
whether in fact or at law, the landowner becomes, in effect, a trus-
tee of the land for the use and benefit of the general public, since
individuals who have rights which they are bound to exercise in
behalf of others or for the accomplishment of some purpose not
necessarily dictated by self-interest, become trustees and hold their
rights in trust.2
Although sixteenth century English jurists, struggling with the
formal proceduralism that led the diverse wits and pens of Shakes-
26. J. LOCKE, Of Property, in OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 132-34 (1955).
27. J. Holmes, 1 REPORT OF COMMISSION 110 (Nat. Conserv. Comm. 1909).
28. See Irwin v. Dixon, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 9 (1850) ; New Orleans v. United States, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) ; Cincinnati v. White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832).
29. Longley v. Worcester, 24 N.E.2d 533, 537 (Mass. 1939); Dickinson v. Ruble, 211
Minn. 373, 375-76, 1 N W.2d 373, 374-75 (1941).
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peare,30  Dickens 1  and Gilbert 2 to taunt the law and mock the
lawyer, considered such trusts a thing collateral, annexed in privity
to the estate of the land and to the person touching the land,
when the property was vested with the public -interest, the people
30. "In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But, being season'd with a gracious voice,
Obscures the show of evil?"
W. SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE III :ii
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
W. SHAKESPEARE, II HENRY VI IV :ii
31. "[Tlhe law is an ass-an idiot." C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 354 (1966).
32. The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything thats excellent.
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, my Lords, embody the Law.
W. GILBERT, IOLANTHSE 252 (1924).
"All thieves who could my fees afford
Relied on my orations,
And many a burglar Ive restored
To his friends and his relations."
W. GILBERT, TRIAL BY JURY 230 (1924).
Whether you're an honest man or
whether you're a thief
Depends on whose solicitor has
given me my brief.
W. GILBERT, UTOPIA LIMITED 43a (1924).
When I went to the Bar as a very young man,
(Said I to myself-said, I,)
I'll work on a new and original plan, ...
I'll never assume that a rogue or a thief
Is a gentlnan worthy implicit belief,
Because his attorney has sent me a brief ....
I'll never throw dust in a juryman's eyes ....
Or hoodwink a judge who is not over-wise, ...
Or assume that the witnesses summoned in force
In Exchequer, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, or Divorce,
Have perjured themselves as a matter of course, ...
Ere I go into court I will read my brief through, ...
And I'll never take work I'm unable to do,...
My learned profession I'll never disgrace
By taking a fee with a grin on my face,
When I haven't been there to attend to the case.
(Said I to myself, said I!)
W. GILBERT, IOLANTHE 258-59 (1924).
See also:
'I'm asham'd (t]he law is such an ass." G. CHAPMAN, REVENGE FOR HONOUR 1:11i
He saw a Lawyer killing a viper
on a dung-hill by his own stable;
And the Devil smiled, for it put him in mind
Of Cain and his brother Abel.
S. COLERIDGE, THE DEVIL'S THOUGHTS IV
I know you Lawyers can, with ease,
Twist words and meaning as you please;
That language, by your skill pliant,
Will bend to favour every client;
That 'tis the fee directs the sense
To make out either side's pretense.
When you peruse the clearest case,
You see it with a double face;
For scepticism's your profession;
You hold there's doubt in all expression.
J. GAY, Fables: The Dog and the Fox in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GAY 277 (G
Fober ed. 1926).
A fox may steal your hens, sir,
[But]
If lawyer's hand is fee'd, sir,
He steals your whole estate.
J. GAY, THE BEGGAR'S OPERA I :vii :Air Xi
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were recognized as the trust beneficiaries (whether vestui que trust
or cestui que use) .83
C. PUBLIC LAND AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
The federal government holds all the public lands of the United
States not as a monarch for private or prerogative purposes, but
as a trustee for the benefit, use and enjoyment of the sovereign
people of the United States.
8 '
The right of a citizen to assert the public interest in the public
lands of the United States as common property held in trust for
the benefit, use and enjoyment of all the people is no different than
the well-recognized right of municipal taxpayers to assert their e-




Perhaps the root of much of the disfavor which the lawyer finds in the eyes of the public
is the continued adherence to a standard of non-involvement and non-accountability which
evolved during post-Elizabethan England.
[A] lawyer has no business with the justice or injustice of the cause which he under-
takes, unless his client asks his opinion, and then he is bound to give it honestly. The jus-
tice or injustice of the cause is to be decided by the judge." BOSWELL, JOURNAL OF A TOUR
To THa HEBRIDES 14 (1961).
"It is time for the Bar to heed certain two thousand year old admonitions: Woe unto you
also, ye lawyers! for ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves
touch not the burdens with one of your fingers." Luke 11:46 (KJV)
"Woe to you! for you build the tombs of the prophets whom your fathers killed." Luke
11:47 (RSV).
"Woe to you lawyers! for you have taken away the key of knowledge; you did not enter
yourselves and you hindered those who were entering." Luke 11:52 (RSV).
33. The Attorney-General v. Parmeter, 10 Price 978, 147 Eng. Rep. 345 (1811), afjl'd.
10 Price 412, 147 Eng. Rep. 356 (1813) (clarifying the rule stated in the Attorney-General
v. Parmeter, 2 Anst. 603, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (1795) as to inalienability of jus publicum,
the public rights).
34. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. Trinidad Coa
Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890) ; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158 (1886).
35. A city or municipality "owns and its officials administer its streets and parks, not
as private proprietors, but as trustees for the people .... " Hague v. Committee for Indust.
Organ., 101 F.2d 774, 785 (3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"The State, or its political subdivision, holds, as a trustee, title to the easement for
public highways and roads. A quasi-corporation such as a city or county, holds such prou-
erty by delegation of the general sovereign power, the authority for its acquisition and
control being governmental and the interest exclusively that of the public." Jefferson
County v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 146 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
871, reh. denied, 324 U.S. 891 (1945).
The'land in these parks, if it was really dedicated to the use of the public for
park purposes, is held in trust for that use, and courts of equity always inter-
fere at the suit of a cestul que trust or a cestui que use to prohibit a viola-
tion of the trust, or a destruction of the right of user. . . . [Tjhe inevitable
conclusion is that his interest in them is ample to enable him to maintain a
suit of equity to prevent their diversion to private users. . . . [T]he
general rule is that a resident taxpayer of a municipality has sufficient
interest, and has the right to maintain a bill to prevent the unlawful disposi-
tion of the money or property of his town or' city . . . and to restrain the di-
version of money or property in his town or city from any public use in which
he shares to which it has been dedicated.
Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1899). Booth v. General Dynamies
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (suit to enjoin alleged diversion of municipal
property through a conspiracy by municipality and defendant resulting in unreasonably
low lease rental of municipal property to defendant).
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[S]ome things are by natural law common to all, some are
public, some belong to a society or corporation and some be-
long to no one.
88
He also stated that certain things (res) are not susceptible of private
ownership. These "things" would include the air, water, sea and
the seashore.37 Since the Roman res was any interest subject to
protection at law or any valuable right or interest, eventually dis-
tinctions between res communes (things common) and res publicae
(things public) blurred and all such property came to be regarded
as res publicae (the property of the people). It was generally set-
tled at Roman Law that res publicae were incapable of alienation. 8
The early Anglo-Saxons and later the conquering Normans evolv-
ed systems recognizing some land in Britain as public land and
imposing a primitive trust obligation on the nominal owner. 9 Even
though a formal theory of tenure may not have been recognized in
Anglo-Saxon England, the Norman conquest imposed one upon the
country. Thereafter all land was held of some lord and ultimately
of the crown. No allodial land remained. All land became terra
regis (the land of the Great Lord), although certain customary com-
mon rights survived. Under this feudal system, common rights be-
came integral and incidental to lands traditionally considered beyond
exclusive private ownership and vital to the existence of the com-
munity.40
36. INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN II. I, § 1 (5th ed. J. Moyle transl. 1913).
37. Id.
38. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896).
39. 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56-63 (3di ed. 1923).
40. The common or open-field method of cultivation has had an extraordinarily long
tenure in the history of the world's agriculture. Without some knowledge or appreciation
of its operation, there can be little understanding of the evolution of real property law as
it affects agricultural lands.
In Anglo-Saxon England, as in the Gaul of Julius Caesar, all the arable land In a
township was divided into two or three open and unenclosed fields which were cultivated
in rotation. Each of the fields was divided into a number of strips, the size of which
varied with the intrinsic suitability of the soils in each field for raising particular crops.
The holding of each landowner consisted of a multitude of strips scattered throughout the
area and intermixed with those of neighbors. Attached to these holdings were certain com-
mon rights.
Certain fields remained fallow each year, and after the crop was cut, and while the field
was fallow, the cattle of the villagers could pasture in the fields. Many areas maintained
Lammas meadows upon which hay was grown and which were divided into strips and sub-
ject to individual ownership while the hay was growing, but common to all the villagers
after the hay had been cut and gathered. As a general rule, there were extensive lands
surrounding each community which were not intrinsically suitable for agricultural cultiva-
tion, and upon which the cattle of the township, or of adjoining townships could graze ot
will, subject to the rules which the community might promulgate.
The opponents of public rights to particularly valuable real property began to de-
nounce this classical system of agriculture from the sixteenth through the nineteenth cen-
turies in England, but although some enclosures took place in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, large areas of prime agricultural land remained unenclosed, and the
common field system was such an integral part of English agriculture that it was trans-
planted by the early colonists to New England.
The intricate delineation of fields, stdips, pastures, hedgerows, furrow-strips and meadows
found on any of the earliest British maps bears a striking resemblance to a modern soils
map of the same area. It is this relationship that probably accounted for the continued
existence of the common field system of agriculture through so many centuries and among
such diverse cultures. Since we can probably assume that the original intention of those
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Into this English feudal system during the thirteenth century,
Henricus de Bracton 4 1 an itinerant justice and ecclesiastic from
Devonshire, forcefully reintroduced Roman law. Quoting the Insti-
tutes of Justinian extensively, he reasserted common rights and the
inalienability in certain lands of the more usual agricultural usages.
There is a direct, but not easily defined relationship between
the English and Roman law. By the end of the fourteenth century,
the English Admiralty Court was using Roman forms of written pro-
cedure and the Roman method of examining witnesses had become
common practice in the Court of Chancery. The sixteenth century
concept of the commonwealth originates in the Roman idea of public
policy. The medieval idea of a natural or universal law and a law
of mankind, born of the curious union of feudalism and Christianity,
restates the jus naturale and jus gentium of the Romans.
4 2
Above all, the fact that the two great legal systems of western
civilization each acknowledged that the rights of the people in and
to the benefit, use and enjoyment of certain lands vested with the
public interest could not be appropriated by private individuals dem-
onstrates that the trust doctrine is not an isolated or parochial ideal
but rather a universal precept.
The earliest application of the trust doctrine in American common
law involved lands under navigable waters4 3 and established that
the land under navigable waters and the shores were subject to a
public trust for the benefit, use and enjoyment of the people; essen-
dividing the community landholdings was to divide them equally, we must recognize that
these people also understood that an equal division of lands involved not only the quantity
but the quality of the land, and the simplest plan was to give each landowner some good
land, some bad land and some land that was not particularly good or bad. It is a tribute
to the agricultural wisdom of these early cultures that they were able to identify these
three classes of soil and then divide each among their people in shares capable of approxi-
mately equal agricultural yield for the same amount of cultivation effort.
The common-field system certainly represents a transition from the early period
In civilization where permanent ownership of land was unknown, and the rather recent
idea that land can be the object of separate and individual ownership.
Caesar described the Gallic tribes as a pastoral and vagrant people cultivating just enough
land each year to supply themselves with grain. Later, Tacitus, describing the same area,
notes that the tribes had come to dwell in small communities where each person had
his own homestead, but the arable land was divided year by year among the villagers
and plowed afresh. The same practices existed among the early Welsh tribesmen who an-
nually plowed fresh grass land, leaving it to return to grass after the year's harvest, a
not so undesirable agricultural practice In the absence of chemical fertilizers and syn-
thetic organic pesticides. Id. at 56-57.
41. It is from Bracton that we obtain almost all of our knowledge of the critical period
In the evolution of English jurisprudence following Magna Carta (the reign of Henry II
and the later part of the thirteenth Century).
42. The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are partly peculiar to
itself, partly common to all mankind. The rules enacted by a given state for its own men,
bers are peculiar to itself, and are called civil law; the rules prescribed by natural reason
for all are observed by all nations alike, and are called gentile law. . . . GAIus, INSTITU-
TIONS JURIS CrVLIS I, § 1 (3d ed. E. Poste transl. 1913). [T]he laws of nature, which are
observed by all nations alike, are established, as it were by divine providence, and remain
ever fixed and immutable: but the municipal laws of each individual state are subject to
frequent change, either by the tacit consent of the people, or by the subsequent enactment
of another statute, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN I, 11, § 11 (5th ed. J. Moyle transl. 1913).
43. See generally 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 2:3.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tially adopting the English common law since Magna Charta, and
recognizing its Roman Law origins. However, as the Industrial Rev-
olution proceeded to make the public waters highways of commerce,
nineteenth century courts began to emphasize riparian rights over
public rights until the Supreme Court called a halt to the erosion
of public rights by setting aside the giveaway of the entire port of
Chicago to the Illinois Central Railroad.
In the Illinois Central case 4 4 the Supreme Court made an ad-
mirable attempt to clarify the Trust Doctrine as far as lands under
navigable waters were concerned.
That the State holds the title to the lands under the navi-
gable waters ... within its limits, in the same manner that
the State holds title to soils under tide water, by common
law, we have already shown; and that title necessarily car-
ries with it control over the waters above them whenever the
lands are subjected to use. But it is a title different in char-
acter from that which the State holds in lands intended for
sale. It is different from the title which the United States
holds in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and
sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties ...
A doctrine . . .which would sanction the abdication of the
general control of the State over lands under . . .navigable
waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake...
is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires
the government of the State to preserve such waters for the
use of the public. The trust devolving upon the State for the
public and which can only be discharged by the management
and control of property in which the public has an interest,
cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The
control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never
be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting
the interests of the public therein or can be disposed of with-
out any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining. It is only by observing the dis-
tinction between a grant of such parcels for the improvement
of the public interest, or which when occupied do not 'sub-
stantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining, and a grant of the whole property in which the
public is interested, that the language of the adjudged cases
can be reconciled. . . The State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested,
. . .so as to leave them entirely under the use and control
of private parties . than it can abdicate its police powers
in the administration of government and the preservation of
peace. In the administration of government the use of such
44. Illinois Central Ry. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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powers may for a limited period be delegated to a munici-
pality or other body, but there always remains with the State
the right to revoke those powers and exercise them in a
more direct manner, and one more conformable to its wishes.
So with trusts connected with public property, or property of
a special character, . . they cannot be placed entirely be-
yond the direction and control of the State.4 5
First in Martin v. Waddell,4 68 when it construed the early colonial
charters as reaffirming public rights, then later, in the Illinois Cen-
tral case when it declared that there could be no irrevocable con-
veyance of property in derogation of the public trust, and finally
in Shivley v. Bowlby, 47 when it extended the English common law
trust doctrine to a major river in Oregon, the Supreme Court con-
tinually recognized the trust doctrine as a basic element of equitable
jurisprudence.
One of the more persuasive authorities on the issue of imposing
the public trust on fertile soils and agricultural land vested with the
public interest is the decision resolving the 1947 confrontation between
the people of the United States of America represented by the
federal government and the State of California over the offshore oil
fields within the three-mile limit. In that case the Supreme Court
held that the federal government has paramount rights in and power
over the area and its natural resources as trustee for all the people
of the United States.
D. IMPOSING THE PUBLIC TRUST ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ in
space as to clothe with [a public interest so great as to jus-
tify regulation] what at other times or in other places would
be a matter of purely private concern. . . . [T]he use by
the public generally of each specific thing affected cannot be
made the test of public interest. . . . [T]he public interest
.may extend to the use of land., [Special circumstances]
dispel the notion that what in its immediate aspect may be
only a private transaction may not be raised by its class or
character to a public affair.
49
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion over property
and its disposition. The more the nominal owner profits from the
use of property by the public, the more the title to that property
becomes encumbered by the rights of those who use it or otherwise
support its profitable use by the owner.5 0 The evolution of society
45. Id. at 452-54.
46. 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
47. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
48. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
49. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
50. Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, Inc., 891 U.S. 308, 316-25 (1968). See also Marsh
v. Alabama, 826 U.S. 501 (1946).
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and the demands of civilization have elevated our prime agricultural
lands to the level of public property subject to equitable protection
on behalf of the people of the United States. Our courts of equity
cannot shut their eyes to matters of public notoriety and general
cognizance. People are starving-not just in Africa, India and the
rest of the Third World, but in the ghettos of our once great cities,
.on Indian reservations and in spent rural areas like Appalachia.
Judges are not struck blind when they ascend the bench and they
are not forbidden to notice as judges what they see as human be-
ings. A court of equity has the responsibility to consider the social
context in which its decisions will have operational effect.5 1 Enforce-
ment of the public trust is one of the great objects of equitable
jurisprudence.
E. THE "TAKING ISSUE"
All private property and many personal rights are held subject
to limitations that may be reasonably imposed in the public interest.
5 2
The Constitution does not secure to any individual, much less to
any corporation, the right to inflict injury upon the commonwealth
or any substantial group of people. Landowners' rights to make use of
their property in furtherance of self-interest must sometimes give
way to overriding public need. 3 There are exceptional times and
places in which the very foundations of the public welfare cannot be
laid without legal insistence upon concessions from one individual
to another which under other circumstances might be left wholly to
voluntary consent.
54
The right of a land owner to obtain just compensation for pro-
perty taken by eminent domain must be balanced against the right
of the sovereign people to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of our
national natural resource treasures, not only during this generation,
but succeeding generations.5 5 As noticed by Environmental Protec-
tion Agency Administrator Russell Train:
Few subjects are more fraught with emotion and less under-
stood than the rights of private property and the Consti-
tutional limits to public control of those rights.56
Land use regulation raises fundamental issues under a variety of
Constitutional provisions, but the clause which has so far represent-
ed the most significant restraint on the public regulation of private
51. Ho Ah Kow v, Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) ; Edwards
v. Habib, 397 F2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
52. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l. v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
54. Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1906).
55. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l. v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960); Nebbla v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
56. TRAIN, Foreward to CouNcm ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY, THE TAKING ISSUE (1978).
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land use is the "taking 'clause" in the fifth amendment, "nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion."
In the introductory note to a recent Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) Report, the authors claim:
The taking issue is the weak link. . . .All over the country
.. .attempts to solve environmental problems through land
use regulation are threatened by the fear that they will be
challenged in court as an unconstitutional taking of private
property without compensation. . . . [because] [n] any
people seriously believe that the Constitution gives every
man the right to do whatever he wants with his land. Foreign
concepts like 'environmental protection' and 'zoning' were
probably sneaked through by the Warren Court! Many more
people recognize the validity of land use regulation in gen-
eral, but believe, that it may never be used to reduce the
value of a man's land to the point where he can't make a
profit on it. After all, what good is land if you can't make a
profit on it. . . .The courts have never adopted either of
these philosophies. ... 57
There is ample precedent for the taking of private property with-
out compensation, particularly by means of use restrictions which
may be so extensive as to deprive landowners of substantial pro-
perty interests.58 The fundamental criterion for determining the con-
stitutionality of regulations which limit the use of property is wheth-
er the regulation confers a benefit on the public commensurate with
the burden imposed on the property owner. 59
In meeting the defense that private property rights are to be
protected in the courts above all other rights, except perhaps, the
right to life itself, it should be remembered that private property
is protected at all only because such protection answers a basic de-
mand of human nature and substitutes the rule of law for the rule
of force in civilized communities.6° Private property rights may al-
ways be modified by a court of equity as the needs of the public de-
mand.61 The Constitution was intended to preserve practical and
substantial human rights, 2 and while the meaning of constitutional
guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand
57. F. Bosselman, D. Callies, & J. Banta, Introduction to COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
58. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Turnpikke Realty Co. v. Dur-
ham, -- Mass.-, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972) ; Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of San-
bornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) ; In re Spring Valley Development, -Me.--, 300
A.2d 736 (1973); Just v. Marinette County. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
59. West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d
640, 642-43 (1956).
60. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).
61. Defenders of Florissant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., No. C-1539 (D. Colo. July 9, 1969),
No. 340-69 (10th Cir. July 10, 1969), No. 403-69 (10th Cir. July 29, 1969).
62. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).
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or contract to meet new and different conditions, for in a changing
world it is impossible that it should be otherwise. Equity provides a
degree of elasticity not to the meaning, but to the application of con-
stitutional principles.68
Flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation has been the
boast and the excellence of the common law which has always claim-
ed to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice. To concede
this capacity for growth and change in our common law, while at the
same time saying that our courts are forever bound to perpetuate such
of their rules as by reasonable test may be subsequently found to be
neither wise nor just, simply because they have once been declared
suitable to the situations and institutions of a past time is to deny to
the common law and equitable jurisprudence the flexibility and cap-
acity for growth required to meet the exigencies of each generation. 64
Law professors and even some judges shudder at the temerity
of those who would challenge the supposedly sacrosanct bundle of
rights usually associated with nominal title to private property-those
rights upon which great fortunes have been made, governments esta-
blished and overthrown, legislatures suborned and the courts often
misled. But a new day is dawning:
The right to make money buying and selling land is a cher-
ished American folkway, and one that cannot be lightly ig-
nored. But in an increasingly crowded and polluted environ-
ment can we afford to continue circulating the myth that tells
us that the taking clause protects this right of unrestricted use
regardless of its impact on society? Obviously not.... 65
The language of the New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. Plan-
ning Board of Town of RamapoG6 appears prophetic.
Every restriction on the use of property entails hardships for
some individual owners. Those difficulties are invariably the
product of police regulation and the pecuniary profits of the in-
dividual must in the long run be subordinated to the needs of
the community. The fact that the ordinance limits the use of,
and may depreciate the value of the property will not render
it unconstitutional, however, unless it can be shown that the
measure is either unreasonable in terms of necessity or the
diminution in value is such as to be tantamount to a confisca-
tion. Diminution, in turn, is a relative factor and though its
magnitude is an indicia of a taking, it does not of itself estab-
lish a confiscation. 67
63. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
64. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
65. Id. The remainder of the CEQ Report seeks to justify this statement by spotty refer-
ences to a number of cases.
66. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 859, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
67. Id. at 381-82, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 154-55. (Citations omitted).
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F. THE DEFENSE OF FLORISSANT68
The mere fact that the representatives of the sovereign people of
the United States oft times cannot move as fast as a landowner's bull-
dozer does not prevent a court of equity from acting on behalf of the
people to protect a national, natural resource treasure threatened with
imminent danger of serious, permanent and irreparable damage. The
preservation of the Florissant Fossil Beds in 1969 represents one of
the most dramatic instances of equitable imposition of a public trust
on private property in the relatively short history of environmental
law.e"
The Florrissant Fossil Beds are located a short distance west of
Colorado Springs, Colorado, and contain seeds, leaves, plants and in-
sects from the Oligocene period (approximately 34 million years ago)
remarkably preserved in more than 6,000 acres of paper-thin layers
of volcanic shale which, unfortunately, disintegrate when the thin lay-
er of soil protecting them from the weather is disturbed.
For many years, scientists, conservationists, naturalists, the Na-
tional Park Service and congressmen worked to protect the fossil
beds by establishing a Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument.
When the bill passed the Senate in 1969, a Colorado Springs real es-
tate company had already contracted to purchase approximately 1,800
acres of the monument, and while the House of Representatives was
deliberating its version of the bill, the land company announced it
would bulldoze a road through the fossil beds to open the acreage for
second home development and immediate sale to anyone interested in
recreational housing. A group of Colorado conservationists were un-
successful in an attempt to persuade the land company to wait until
the House of Representatives acted on the bill, or at the least confine
excavation and development to the area lying outside the fossil beds.
The land company refused, but did offer to sell the land containing
the fossil beds-for immediate cash at twice what it had contracted
to purchase the land for.
Faced with the irreparable loss of a substantial portion of these
unique and irreplaceable fossil beds, a small group of concerned citi-
zens formed a non-profit, public benefit corporation called the De-
fenders of Florissant and commenced an action for declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief against the land company and all the other
landowners and contract vendees in the area to be included within
the national monument.
The United States District Court heard the application for a tern-
68. Defenders of Florissant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., No. C-1539 (D. Colo. July 9, 1969.).
No. 340-69 (10th Cir. July 10, 1969), No. 403-69 (10th Cir. July 29, 1969).
69. For a complete discussion of the defense of Florissant with extensive references, see
1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 2 :9.
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porary restraining order on July 9, 1969, and although the Defenders
of Florissant established, without challenge or contradiction, that the
excavations for roads and culverts threatened by the land company
would result in loss of some of the most valuable areas within the
proposed national monument, the District Court held that there was
nothing preventing the land company from using its property in any
way not expressly prohibited by law. While denying the application
for a temporary restraining order and a subsequent application for a
stay pending appeal, the District Court did note, in passing, the im-
portance of preserving the fossil beds.
Following this decision, the land company agreed to postpone ex-
cavation over the weekend if there was some assurance the purchase
price could be raised -in that time. The Defenders of Florissant gave up
attempts, to raise the ransom for the fossil beds and appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals the following morning. At the hearing,
before that court in the afternoon, the three judges questioned wheth-
er they had authority to issue a restraining order in the absence of
any statute protecting the fossils.
Admitting that Congress, in its infinite wisdom, had not seen fit to
pass legislation protecting fossil beds in general, plaintiffs' counsel
argued that "if someone had found the original Constitution of the
United States buried on his land and then wanted to use it to mop
the floor, is there any doubt . . . they could be restrained?"
The Defenders of Florissant argued that the right to preservation
of the unique and irreplaceable fossils, a national, natural resource
treasure, was one of the unenumerated rights retained by the people
of the United States under the ninth amendment of the Constitution
and as such was entitled to protection under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fifth amendment, and the rights, privi-
leges and immunities, due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.
While recognizing the right of the nominal landowners to make
reasonable use of their land and to profit from their record title, the
defenders claimed that a court of equity could impose a public trust
on that portion of the property that had become vested with the pub-
lic interest, the 34 million year old fossil shales. Procedurally, the
defenders invoked the federal equity jurisdiction by asserting the
fundamental equitable maxim, "no wrong shall be suffered without
a remedy."
In summation, Counsel for the Defenders of Florissant picked up
one of the fossil palm leaves that had been uncovered at Florissant,
and holding it up to court, pleaded:
The Florissant fossils are to geology, paleontology, paleo-
botony, palynology and evolution what the Rosetta Stone was
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to Egyptology. To sacrifice this 34 million year old record,
a record you might say written by the mighty hand of God,
for 30 year mortgages and the basements of the A-frame
ghettos of the seventies is like wrapping fish with the Dead
Sea Scrolls.
After a short recess, the Court of Appeals returned to the bench
and announced that they were issuing an order restraining the land
company and other land owners in the area from "disturbing the
soil, subsoil or geological formations of the Florissant fossil beds
by any physical or mechanical means."
After a trial on July 29, 1969, the District Court denied
the Defenders' application for a preliminary injunction for the same
reasons it had previously denied the application for a temporary
restraining order, and the land company announced that it would
begin excavation that afternoon although Congress had not com-
pleted action on the national monument bill. Several hours later,
the defenders filed a motion for an emergency stay with the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the landowners threat, and the
Court of Appeals dramatically issued an order extending its prior
restraining order indefinitely.
During the argument of the appeal, the Defenders of Florissant
pursued their original theory that the fossil beds had become the
corpus of a public trust and had aquired a public character by
the actions of Congress and the unique and irreplaceable nature of
the fossils themselves. The Court of Appeals reserved decision at
the close of the arguments and continued the temporary restrain-
ing order.
On July 31, 1969, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Com-
mittee, through its Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, favor-
ably reported an amended version of the bill, and the entire House
of Representatives passed its version of the bill as a number of
concerned congressmen from all over the country turned out to
suspend the rules and consider the bill out of the regular order. The
Senate agreed to the House version of the bill and the President
signed it on August 14, 1969. The preliminary restraining order is-
sued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remained in effect while
the United States of America instituted suit to acquire the land by
condemnation. The Florissant Fossil Beds were saved as the result
of a clean hands appeal to equitable jurisprudence, properly framed
and imaginatively articulated, establishing the existence of an envi-
ronmental wrong and demanding an equitable remedy.
While the court order prohibiting excavation of the fossil beds
may have deprived the landowners of one profitable use of their
land, they were free to develop the area for tourism, recreation,
scientific research, or other uses compatible with protection of the
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fossils, and although such alternate uses might not represent the
most profitable use of the land, the speculators could still earn a
reasonable return on their investment. The mere fact that the
land company did not wish to use its land for such purposes did
not make the judicial restraint on the land development activities
a taking without due process of law and just compensation where
the public interest in the land was clearly established.
The message of the Florissant litigation is -clear. The value to
the public of protecting a resource treasure as unique and irre-
placeable as the Florissant fossils is so substantial that it cries out
for equitable relief and warrants judicial limitation of certain rights
normally incident to the private ownership of property.
G. LITIGATION STRATEGY
To obtain equitable relief limiting the use of private property
requires that the petitioner establish by a fair preponderance of
the substantial, credible scientific evidence that the challenged ac-
tion represents an imminent danger of serious, permanent and irre-
parable damage to some unique and essentially irreplaceable na-
tional, natural resource treasure and that the property which is the
subject matter of the application for equitable relief has become
vested with the public interest to such an extent that beneficial
ownership is in all the people, not only of this generation, but of
those generations yet unborn.
Although an appeal to equity for protection of our irreplaceable
natural heritage, the agricultural lands of this country which are
capable of not only feeding Americans during this and succeeding
generations, but which represent the means of overcoming world-
wide malnutrition and starvation seems very attractive, the burden
on the petitioner and environmental advocate is substantial.
It must be established by a fair preponderance of the substan-
tial, credible scientific evidence.
1. That our Class I, Class II, and Class III soils and our agri-
cultural lands are a unique, national, natural resource treasure of
significance to all the people of the United States not only of this, but
succeeding generations.
2. That the land use or other actions sought to be restrained,
prohibited or otherwise limited represent an imminent danger of ser-
ious, permanent and irreparable damage to the resource sought to
be protected.
3. That equitable relief is the appropriate means of protect-
ing the resource and insuring its wise use consistent with constitu-
tional protection of human rights and values.
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There is no justification for bringing any action to protect the
soils and landscape that are the basis for the agricultural produc-
tivity of this nation in any form other than a class action seeking a
declaration of the rights of all the people of the United States, not
only of this generation but of those generations yet unborn, in and to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the fruits of our fertile soils
and agricultural lands.
Just as the class action became the established means of assert-
ing the fundamental human and civil rights of entire groups of citi-
zens, it represents the best means of establishing environmental
rights. However, it should be clearly understood that the class ac-
tion in public interest litigation is only appropriate when seeking a
declaration of rights and equitable relief.
7 0
Litigation over the national interest in agricultural lands belongs
in the federal courts and it may be of interest to review the nature
bf federal equity jurisdiction. The federal equity jurisdiction in-
eludes all those suits in which relief is sought according to the prin-
ciples, practices and remedies of the English Court of Chancery
through 1789, the time of separation of our two countries. While it
is true that the inferior federal courts are creatures of statute,
nevertheless, they are possessed of the inherent equitable powers
of common-law courts, and it is well settled that a United States
District Court, sitting as a court of equity, has the power and the
obligation to grant complete relief in each matter before it.71
IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 (NEPA)
A. NEPA AND AGRICULTURE
If it can be established that agriculturally productive lands are,
in fact, a unique, national, natural resource treasure, and, if some
federal agency or program is responsible for the threat to continued
agricultural productivity, then an environmental impact statement
should be prepared as required by the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1969 (NEPA) .72 Preparation of an environmental im-
pact statement, however, will not protect the resource.
70. See id. at § 6 :10. Note that the limitations on class actions for money damages im-
posed by such decisions as Zahn v. International Paper, 469 F.2d 1033, (2d Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (51 N.D.L. REV. 522 (1974)) should not be construed as pro-
hibiting aggregation of claims by plaintiffs, or determining the amount from the point of
view of the defendant in actions seeking equitable relief and not money damages. Ot
course, actions raising fundamental constitutional issues, seeking declaratory judgment and
equitable relief do not require a showing of any particular jurisdictional amount in order
to establish federal jurisdiction.
71. See generally 1 ENVmONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 6:12.
72. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 5:5, V. Yannacone,
Jr., & S. Davison, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 8-33
(1970) ; V. Yannacone, Jr., The Origins of a National Environmental Policy, in THE ENER-
GY CRIsis: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 385 (V. Yannacone, Jr., ed. 1956). For an interesting
extension of the application of NEPA to national fiscal policy, see Like, NEPA, Energy
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The difficulty in reconciling the miasma of apparently incon-
sistent decisions arising out of the morass of litigation spawned by
these "Piper Cub" lawyers3 that our eminent Chief Justice is so
fond of is that most of them are disposed of by the mere completion
of an environmental impact statement by the federal agency in-
volved. The "747 litigation" which no doubt the Supreme Court ea-
gerly awaits would challenge the proposed federal agency action on
the merits and supported by a fair preponderance of the substantial,
credible scientific evidence, the petitioner would ask the Court for
equitable relief, not just an order requiring the agency to prepare an
environmental impact statement.
The environmental impact statement required by NEPA and pre-
pared under present Council on Evironmental Quality (CEQ) guide-
lines by federal agencies, and by state agencies and permittees in
the many states that now have "little NEPAs," and those munici-
palities that now have still smaller NEPAs, has become an exer-
cise in data gathering developed by natural scientists primarily for
consideration by other natural scientists. With new input from so-
cial scientists and economists, many environmental impact state-
ments now include a component designed by social scientists and
economists for consideration by other social scientists and econo-
mists.
It is about time for the environmental impact statement to be
replaced by the environmental audit.7 4 The difference between the
conventional environmental impact statement and the environmental
audit is one of emphasis and objective. The environmental audit is
designed to meet the needs of decision makers and those respon-
sible for public policy: the people and the people's representatives.
Although the preparation of environmental impact statements is
generally directed by scientists and engineers, the environmental au-
dit must be commissioned and carried out by legislators, citizens,
and yes, even bureaucrats.
The environmental audit begins with a description of the regional
ecological system, defined as the three dimensional space in which
any of the activities associated with the project can affect land,
water, air, plants, animals and human beings, and such effects
can be observed. For any significant project, the system may in-
clude portions of many geopolitical units.
and the Economy in THE ENERGY CRISIS: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 367 (V. Yannacone,
Jr., ed. 1974).
73. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, 10 TRIAL LAW. Q. 12 (Spring 1974).
74. Victor John Yanacone, Jr., "Environmental Auditing," Briefing Conference on En-
vironflental Law, before Federal Bar Association/Bureau of National Affairs In Chicago,
Illinois, May 1, 1973; "The Environmental Audit: Necessary Protection for the Investor,
Developer or Property Manager," National Real Estate Investor, 53, 56 (Oct. 1973) ;
NEPA: Environmental Audit vs. Environmental Impact Statement, In ENERGY, THE EN-
VIRONMENT AND LAND USE (G. Sterlied ed. 1974).
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Consideration of a regional ecological system would seem to be
the concern of regional planners, but the science, or more accu-
rately art, of regional planning, has failed to provide our courts
and lawmakers with a sophisticated, readily justiciable definition
of "region," much less regional ecological system. Perhaps the
reason for this unhappy state of affairs is that regional planners
continually look for a "region" which can be isolated as an entity
for study purposes and precisely located in time and space-just as
the early physicists who were prisoners of philosophical determinism
and the mathematics of analysis vainly sought to predict the future
activities of elusive sub-atomic particles with precision until Werner
Heisenberg, in what was to become the now famous "Uncertainty
Principle" of modern physics, demonstrated the utter futility of
attempting to predict the future state of dynamic, probalistic sy-
stems by studying their activities at some particular point in space
and instant in time.
Since the regional ecological system is defined as the entire
space in which any effect attributable to the activities being con-
sidered can be perceived, all of the effects of such activities on
land, in the air and water, and upon plants, animals, human be-
ings and society must be identified. The description and identifi-
cation phases of the environmental audit generally proceed contem-
poraneously although not necessarily simultaneously.
The environmental audit concludes with an evaluation of en-
vironmental impact including a consideration of long term effects,
since the recent trends in judicial decisions and legislative action
at federal, state and local levels demonstrate increasing concern
for the effects of environmentally significant activities over long
periods of time and at locations far removed from the original site
of operations.
Unfortunately, just as in the case of the Cross-Florida Barge
Canal, 75 there is more likelihood that concerned citizens will be
forced to prepare an environmental audit on the proposals to sacri-
fice our prime agricultural lands, than the government agencies
which have been charged with the maintenance of this unique and
irreplaceable natural resource treasure will prepare an adequate
environmental impact statement.
B. NEPA AND STANDING
NEPA appears to have expanded the notion of standing in fed-
75. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGNTS & REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 7:23. For a copy of
the actual Counter-102 Statement prepared by the Florida Defenders of the Environment
which led to the initial reconsideration of the Cross Florida Barge Canal project, see:
Victor John Yannacone, Jr., "The Cross-Florida Barge Canal Counter-102 Statement,"
1I Environmental Systems Science, ch. 10 Proceedings of the A.B.A. National Institute on
Environmental Litigaion (A.B.A., Chicago 1974).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
eral administrative agency proceedings,'7 but to what end? Stand-
ing was always available to a "party aggrieved" or the representa-
tive of a "party aggrieved" under the Administrative Procedure
Act.7" NEPA cannot confer standing on a party not otherwise en-
titled to it in equity or under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Standing evolved as a legal concept to assure a court that the part-
ies to a lawsuit were sufficiently concerned with the outcome of
the action that they could litigate the issues with vigor, based on
sufficient self-interest to insure that the essential integrity of the
adversary system of litigation in Anglo-American jurisprudence
would not be compromised even though the subject matter of the
action might. Standing is not a procedural rule to be rotely applied
like a mathematical formula, but a legal concept that must be re-
examined in the context of each controversy presented to a court
for resolution.
The seemingly contrary holding in Sierra Club v. Mortont can
be attributed, in large measure, to the failure of the Sierra Club
to adequately establish its position as a person or party aggrieved
-a failure of proof, rather than judicial imposition of an inflexible
rule of standing in environmental litigation. The real tragedy of
this case was the failure of the Sierra Club to establish the basic re-
quisites for equitable relief in environmental litigation-imminent
danger of serious, permanent and irreparable damage to a national,
natural resource treasure.
Had the Sierra Club:
1. amended its complaint to challenge the proposed re-
creational development, supporting highway and overhead
transmission lines on the grounds that such a develop-
ment does not represent the highest and best use of a
national natural resource treasure;
2. . . . alleged that determination of the highest and best
use of a national natural resource treasure must utilize
modern methods of environmental systems science;
3. . . . brought the action "on behalf of all the people of
the United States, not only of this generation, but of
those generations yet unborn, who are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the national, natural re-
source treasure without degradation by reason of the
failure of the federal agencies to determine the ecologi-
cal impact of their proposed public improvements upon
such .a national natural resource treasure in accordance
with modern methods of environmental systems sci-
ence;"
76. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 7:5.
77. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et. seq. (1970).
78. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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4 ... then offered to prove by a fair preponderance of the
substantial, credible, scientific evidence that the proposed
government action did, in fact, represent an imminent
danger of serious, permanent and irreparable damage; 7 9
the action would have had a substantial probability of success, and
the real issues could have been laid before the conscience of the com-
munity in the courtroom rather than the press. The evidence eli-
cited on trial and tested in the crucible of cross-examination
might have led Congress, as the representatives of the people to re-
consider the entire project, just as the President reconsidered the
Cross-Florida Barge Canal in 1970.80
To the extent that the National Environmental Policy Act is:
[m]ore than a statement of what we believe as a people
and as a nation. It establishes priorities and gives expression
to our national goals and aspirations. It provides a statutory
foundation to which administrators may refer for guidance in
making decisions which find environmental values in conflict
with other values.
What is involved is a congressional declaration that we
do not intend, as a government, or as a people, to initiate
actions which endanger the continued existence or the health
of mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate actions
which will do irreparable damage to the air, land, and water
which support life on earth.
An environmental policy is a policy for people. Its pri-
mary concern is with man and his future. The basic principle
of the policy is that we must strive in all that we do, to
achieve a standard of excellence in man's relationship to his
physical surroundings. If there are to be departures from this
standard' of excellence they should be exceptions to the rule
and the policy.
81
V. AGRICULTURE, THE LAWS OF NATURE AND THE NATURAL
LAW
The problem of obtaining enough, food to eat has plagued man-
79. Id. at 731-35.
80. Environmental Def. Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
A few days later on January 19, 1971, President Nixon stated in a press release:
I am today ordering a halt to further construction of the Cross Florida Barge
Canal to prevent potentially serious environmental damages....
A natural resource treasure is involved in the case of the Barge Canal-the
Ocklawaha River-a uniquely beautiful, semitropical stream, one of a very
few of its kind in the United States, which would be detsroyed by construc-
tion of the Canal....
The step I have taken today will prevent a past mistake from causing perma-
nent damage. But more important, we must assure that in the future we take
not only full but also timely account of the environmental impact of such
projects-so that instead of merely halting the damage, we prevent it.
Address by President Nixon, Jan. 19, 1971, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 43 (1971).
To this date, the only writing that the order has had, according to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida, is that press release. For further litigation
involving the Cross Florida Barge Canal, see: Canal Authority v. Callaway, 6 ERC 1801
(5th Cir. 1974) ; 6 ERC 1808 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
81. 115 CONG. R1C. 40416 (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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kind since Adam and Eve were driven out of the Garden of Eden
and the Promised Land ran out of milk and honey. In spite of the
technological advances of this century, accelerating population
growth and the continuing reduction in the amount of arable land
available for cultivation and food production drive the solution to
this ageless problem even further out of reach. Conventional agri-
cultural practices now provide an adequate and assured supply of
food for less than one-third of the human race, 82 and as the tech-
nology of modern offensive warfare becomes more accessible to
the remaining hungry nations of the Third World, the instability in
the global political system increases.
The available supply of arable land and soil suitable for culti-
vation in this world is finite and some of the land which has been
farmed for centuries is now being sacrificed to non-farming uses or
abandoned. The only country in the world which has a ready reserve
of cropland is the United States, but even the return of idle cropland
in the United States to production will not increase world food
supply sufficiently to assure adequate nutrition for all the people
in the world.
The increased crop yield since World War II that has been en-
thusiastically referred to as the "Green Revolution," has its price
in the amount of energy required. As the non-removable sources of
energy are depleted, the rate of increase in productivity must slow
and eventually the overall curve of agricultural productivity will
flatten out and resemble the general "S-curve" or logistic curve of
growth. The only question open to speculation at this time is
whether we are still on the exponentially rising portion of that
curve or whether we have already approached the upper limit.
Perhaps a question of more importance to the cause of world peace
is whether the inevitable slowing of the exponential improvement in
agricultural productivity will occur abruptly and with little warning
sometime during this decade or gradually over a number of suc-
ceeding generations.
While more than half of the food energy consumed in the United
States is derived from animals, the people who inhabit the rest of
the world derive less than 25 per cent of their food energy from ani-
mal products. Throughout the world outside of the United States more
than half of the human energy needs are supplied by grain and
grain products, while only 20 per cent of the human energy needs of
the United States are directly satisfied by grain products. Since
grains and legumes supply almost two-thirds of the human energy
needs for the world outside the United States, and since it takes
about five times as much grain and legumes to feed the animals
82. G. BORGSTROM, Too MANY XI (1969).
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which eventually become food for man than it would take to supply
the same amount of energy to man as result of the direct consumption
of the same grain and legumes, it should be obvious even to Ameri-
cans that eventually less grain and legumes must be used for live-
stock feed and more made available for direct human consump-
tion.8 3
In the cruel conflict between food supply and population, there
is much rhetoric, little fact and a great deal of fable. There can be
no doubt, however, that the surface of the earth is finite and that
portion which can be reasonably expected to produce food is even
more limited. Although energy is the primary need of all living crea-
tures, and human beings can survive only if sufficient food energy is
available, the problem of hunger cannot be solved by merely in-
creasing the abundance of grain. Increasing the amount of grain
available for human consumption simply shifts the problem of glo-
bal nutrition from one of inadequate caloric (energy) intake to one
of inadequate protein intake, and the supply of protein available to
the people of the world becomes the major constraint limiting hu-
man development and well being. Today, protein deficiencies are
more widespread and cause more human misery than caloric short-
ages.
8 4
During the Great Depression, Aldo Leopold8 5 pleaded for a con-
servation ethic. In philosophy an ethic differentiates social from
anti-social conduct, but in biology, an ethic limits freedom of action
in the struggle for existence.se
The biologist calls [the tendency of inter-dependent indivi-
duals or societies to evolve modes of cooperation,] sym-
bioses. Man elaborated certain advance symbioses called
politics and economics. Like their simpler biological antece-
dents, [they] enable individuals or groups to exploit each
other in an orderly way.87
The original common characteristic of all symbiotic relationships
83. III PROCEEDINGS, SEVENTIH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF NUTRITION 64-5 (1967).
84. A. Banks, Catastrophes and Restraints, in POPULATION OF FOOD SUPPLY 52-3 (1969).
85. Aldo Leopold was born in Iowa in 1887. His professional career began in 1909 when
he joined the United States Forest Service. In 1924 he became Associate Director of the
Forest Products Laboratory in Madison, Wisconsin and in 1933 The University of Wiscon-
sin created a chair of game management for him. He died in 1948 fighting a grass fire on
a neighbor's farm, shortly after he had become an advisor on conservation to the United
Nations. Perhaps his most popular work is a book of essays. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY
ALMANAC (1949). His technical publications on game management are numerous, including
a classic textbook. A. LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT (1939). Much of the material in this
paper is adapted from the foregoing works, together with Leopold, The Conservation Ethic,
31 JOURNAL OF FORESTRY 634 (1933), and augmented by discussions with several of his
children, Luna Leopold of the United States Geological Survey and Dr. Estella B. Leopold,
also of the United States Geological Survey, the paleontologist who established by a fair
preponderance of the substantial, credible, scientific evidence that the Florissant fossils
were a unique, national, natural resource treasure in Imminent danger of serious perma-
nent and irreparable damage.
86. A. Leopold, The Conservation Ethic, 31 JOURNAL OF FORESTRy 634 (1933).
87. Id.
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was expendiency but, as the complexity of cooperative mechanisms
increased with population density and technological efficiency the
human community eventually found expediency no longer a suffici-
ent standard and was forced to evolve ethical standards. In the be-
ginning, ethics dealt with relations among individuals and later with
the relationships between individuals and society. 8
There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relationship to
land and to the non-human animals and plants which grow
upon it. Land like Odysseus' slave-girls, is still property.
The land-relation is still economic, entailing privileges but
not obligations.8 9
The evidence that a new land ethic is needed has been with us
since the earliest days of recorded history. Ezekial and Isaiah ad-
monished us that despoilation of the land is not only inexpedient,
but wrong, nevertheless, society has not yet recognized that the
extension of human ethics to include the relationships between man
and the land is just the next step in evolution.
For scientists and lawyers who are uncomfortable with philos-
ophy, an ethic may be regarded:
As a mode of guidance for meeting ecological situations
so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions,
that the path of social expediency is not discernable to the
average individual. . . . Civilization is not the . . . enslave-
ment of a stable and constant earth. It is a state of mutual
and interdependent cooperation among human animals,
other animals, plants, and soils, which may be disrupted at
any moment by the failure of any of them. Land despoilation
has evicted nations, and can on occasion do it again.91
Plant succession has been a determining factor in historical
evolution.
In the years following the Revolution, three groups contended
for control of the Mississippi valley: the native Indians, the
French and English traders, and American settlers. Historians
wonder what would have happened if the English at Detroit
had thrown more weight into the Indian side of those tipsy
scales which decided the outcome of the Colonial migra-
tion into the cane-lands of Kentucky. Yet who ever wondered
why the cane-lands, when subjected to the particular mix-
ture of forces represented by the cow, plow, fire, and axe of
the pioneer, became bluegrass? What if the plant succession
inherent in this "dark and bloody ground" had, under the
impact of those forces, given us some worthless sedge, shrub
or weed? Would Boone and Kenton have held out? Would
there have been any overflow into Ohio? Any Louisiana
88. Id.




Purchase? Any transcontinental union of new states? Any
Civil War? Any machine age? Any Depression? The subse-
quent drama of American history, here as elsewhere, hung in
large degree on the reaction of particular soils to the impact of
particular forces exerted by a particular kind and degree
of human occupation. No statesman-biologist selected those
forces, nor foresaw their effects. That chain of events, which
in Fourth of July we call our National Destiny hung on a
"fortuitous concourse of elements," the interplay of which we
can now only dimly decipher by hindsight.92
Contrast Kentucky with what hindsight tells us about the
Southwest. The impact of occupancy here brought no blue-
grass, nor other plant fitted to withstand the bumps and
buffetings of misuse. Most of these soils when grazed re-
verted through a successive series of more and more worth-
less grasses, shrubs, and weeds to a condition of unstable
equilibrium. Each recession of plant types bred erosion; each
increment to erosion bred a further recession of plants. The
result today is still a progressive and mutual deterioration,
not only of plants and soils, but of the animal community
subsisting thereon. The early settlers did not expect this,
[s]o subtle has been its progress that few people
know anything about it. s
All civilization seems to have been conditioned upon whether
the natural plant succession, under the impact of human occupation,
led to a stable and habitable assortment of vegetative types or an
unstable and uninhabitable assortment. The swampy forest that Cea-
sar found in Gaul were full changed by human use for the better;
while Moses' land of milk and honey was utterly changed for the
worse. Both, changes were the unpremediated result of the impact
between ecological and economic forces.
94
This generation is no less proud of technological ingenuity than
prior generations. We drive cars with the solar energy impounded
in the carboniferous forest of bygone ages. We fly through the air
in mechanical birds. We hurl our words and pictures through space,
and we have landed men on the moon.
But are these not in one sense mere parlor tricks compared
with our utter ineptitude in keeping land fit to live upon?
Our engineering has attained the pearly gates of near-millen-
nium, but our applied biology still lives in the nomads' tents
of the stone age. If our system of land-use happens to be
self-perpetuating we stay. If it happens to be self-destructive
we move, like Abraham, to pastures new.95
Consider what the astronauts who look down at the Southwestern
United States see:
92. Id. at 635-36.
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A score of mountain valleys which were green gems of fer-
tility when first described by Coronado, Espejo, Pattie, Abert,
Sitgreaves, and Couzens. What are they now? Sandbars,
wastes of cobbles and burroweed, a path for torrents. Rivers
which Pattie said were clear, now muddy sewers for the
wasting fertility of empire. A "Public Domain," once a vel-
vet carpet of rich buffalo-grass and grama, now an illimnit-
able waste of rattlesnake bush and tumbleweed, too impov-
erished to be accepted as a gift by the states within which
it lies. 96
Why? Because the ecology of this Southwest happened to be
set on a hair trigger. Because cows ate brush when the grass
is gone, and thus postponed the penalties of over-utilization.
Because certain grasses, when grazed too closely to bear
seed-stalks, are weakened and give way to inferior grasses,
and these to inferior shrubs, and these to weeds, and these
to naked earth.
Because rain which spatters upon vegetated soils stays clear
and sinks, while rain which spatters upon devegetated soils
seals its interstices with colloidal mud and hence must run
away as floods, cutting the heart out of the country as it
goes .
97
Unforeseen ecological reactions not only make or break the
[historical evolution of a people,] they condition, circum-
scribe, delimit, and warp all enterprises, both economic and
cultural, that pertain to land. In the corn belt, after grazing
and plowing out all of the cover in the interests of "clean
farming," we grew tearful about wild-life, and spent several
decades passing laws for its restoration. We were like Canute
commanding the tide. . . . [We now know that the] im-
plements for restoration lie not in the legislature, but in the
[farmer's] toolshed. 8
In other instances we take credit for . . . ecological wind-
falls. In the Lake States and the Northeast lumbering, pulp-
ing, and fire accidentally created scores of millions of acres
of new second-growth. At the proper stage we find these
thickets full of deer. For this we naively thank the wisdom
of our game laws. 99
[T]he reaction of land to occupancy determines the nature
and duration of civilization. . . . In all climates the plant
succession determines what economic activities can be sup-
ported. Their nature and intensity in turn determine not only
the domestic but also the wild plant and animal life, the
scenery and the whole face of nature. We inherit the earth,
but within the limits of the soil and plant succession we also
rebuild the earth - without plan, without knowledge of its
properties, and without understanding of the increasingly
coarse and powerful tools which science has placed at our
96. Id. at 636-37.





disposal. We are remodeling the Alhambra with a steam-
shovel.1 00
In 1933, Aldo Leopold wrote:
[The] interactions between man and land are too impor-
tant to be left to chance, even that sacred variety of chance
known as economic law. . . . [A]1 the new isms-Social-
ism, Communism, Facism . . . outdo even Capitalism itself
in preoccupation with . . . the distribution of more machine-
made commodities to more people. They all proceed on the
theory that if we can all keep warm and full, . . . own a
Ford and a radio, the good life will follow. Their programs
differ only in ways to mobilize machines to this end ...
They are competitive apostles of a single creed: salvation
by machinery.101
In 1974, Angelo Cerchione wrote:
For years . . . men have known, or with the exercise of
reasonable prudence should have known, that at some point
in time, -all our fossil fuels: coal, oil and natural gas would
eventually be consumed. Nevertheless, during those same
years, the public has been led to believe that when coal, oil
and natural gas were no longer available . . . other sources
of cheap, convenient energy would be available. (Plucked
from the ether, perhaps, by the nimble technological fingers
of our scientists and engineers.) Satisfied, [however,] man-
kind dozed-warmed and cozened by the petrochemical fire in
the basement and illuminated by the electrical fire in the
lamp-fat headed in fossil fueldom.
10 2
Since much of the public opposition to destruction of our pro-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. A. Cerchione, Crisis, In THE ENERGY CRISIS: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 410 (V.
Yannacone ed. 1975). Angelo Cerchione also stated:
In 1933, F. Scott Fitzgerald described the heroine of Tender Is The Night
as a lovely lady genie whose birth was signaled by the Industrial Revolution.
To the applause of capitalism, the silent nod of obeisance from workers every-
where, and a Disney-like swirl of sparkling, clattering, bank specie, reaching
its crescendo in a Ziegfield-Hurok spectacular, Scott's Nicole was born.
If F. Scott Fitzgerald were still with us today, his heroine might be a Tinker
Bell grown to starlet size, whose existence is ever more magical than Nicole's
could ever be. The consort for this generation descends into our midst in a
cloud of restless electrons, delights us with an overpowering attention to de-
tail, and does many things for us with intoxicating speed. Yet our techno-
logical Tinker Bell is really a puppet and the strings that control her lead
far from the scene of her efforts.
... To the resources stored within the earth
... To that constant source of life-giving energy, the sun.
... To corporate boardrooms where economic policy is fashioned
... To the offices of government agencies with limited statutory missions to
advance
... To that Janus-like figure of technology that promises to deliver so much
comfort for the ransom it demands
To the environmental nursery and graveyard of all those other aspiring
civilizations of the past [the land and the sea]
... To the power plants which energize our Tinker Bell from the distance.
And now, just at the height of our fascination, strings snap threatening the
handWaiden of our way of life.
Id. at 411.
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ductive agricultural lands can be expected to originate within the
organized "conservation movement," we should review the evolution
of "conservation" as a social and political force in the United States.
At its inception, the Conservation Movement sought to save
species from extermination, and the means to this end was restric-
tive legislation. The whole structure of the program was negative
and prohibitory. Gun powder and blood-lust were the variables need-
ing control and it was assumed that land and the landscape would
be constants in the ecological equations. At least as far as migratory
waterfowl were concerned the Conservation Movement evolved to
the point of recognizing that soil and plant succession determined
quality and quantity of human satisfaction to be derived from plant
and animal life. Gunpower was relegated to the status of a tool
for harvesting one of these satisfactions and the blood-lust of the
hunter was simply recognized as one source of motive power behind
the movement to preserve and conserve waterfowl habitat. The im-
mediate effects of this insight brought better hunting and fishing.0 3
Perhaps the continuing evolution of the conservation movement will
bring more profound improvements in the quality of life. Certainly
the demands of conservation organizations heard in courtrooms
throughout the land since 1966104 are a far cry from the early days
of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, when it seemed that all
the conservationists wanted were ducks in the marsh, deer in the
forest, trout in the streams, salmon in the rivers, robins on the
103. Leopold, supra note 86.
104. E.g., Yannacone v. Dennison, 55 Misc. 2d 468, 285 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1967). Environ-
mental Law and Environmental Litigation became recognized elements of our legal sys-
tem in the Spring of 1966 when a suburban New York housewife brought an action on
behalf of all the citizens of Suffolk County, New York, not only of this generation, but
of those generations yet unborn, seeking equitable relief from a toxic insult to the com-
munity eco-system. The real defendant in that action was not the local mosquito control
commission still routinely using DDT in an attempt to control a mosquito population that
had long since become resistant to the chemical but the broad-spectrum, persistant chemical
biocide, 1,1,1-trichloro-2,2-bis (parachlorophenyl) ethane, DDT Itself.
The New York State Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction restraining the County
of Suffolk from using DDT for mosquito control on August 15, 1966, and continued this
"temporary" injunction until December 6, 1967, finally holding that:
DDT has, by Its inherent chemical stability, become a continuing factor in
some ecological life cycles so as to profoundly alter them and the environmen-
tal equilibrium. Thus, it is reasonably apparent that DDT Is capable of and
actually has to some extent caused extraordinary damage to the resources of
this county, if in no other way, the chemical by its very stability has intro-
duced an element of instability in the general eco-system. For instance, by
reducing a food source of some of the larger wildlife and so reducing the
over-all larger wildlife population, lesser elements multiply more quickly.
These lower forms are presumably more of a nuisance, assuming they In turn
survive. Furthermore, DDT affects wildlife directly. Its ingestion, from what-
ever source, has the capability, it seems, to disrupt reproductive processes or
even more simply, act as a poison. It is fairly apparent then that the appli-
cation of DDT in Suffolk County has and is continuing to have a demon-
strable effect on local wildlife, reducing It slowly but surely, either directly
across the board or indirectly from the top down, but reducing it nevertheless.
We have a situation where plaintiff has at least minimally sustained a mas-




lawn, a few parks here and there, some scenic highways to reach
the parks, and a conservation commissioner or Secretary of the In-
terior to make them feel like they had the ear of government! '105
Today those who are charged with the responsibilities of holding
a substantial portion of the world's most productive soils should
look around them. Black, brown, red, yellow, and even white con-
sumers are shopping for a better world with a whole new shopping
list.l:e Before dismissing the preceding discussion as empty rhetoric
better suited to a conservation revival tent than a Law Review, con-
sider that the evolution of natural law doctrines is closely associated
with major developments in world history. The Roman, Empire per-
sisted for as long as it did because, among other national skills,
the Romans were excellent farmers and land managers with a keen
appreciation of the agricultural potential of the lands in the then
known world.
10 7
The ancient controversy over the nature of law (ius) -whether
ius quia iustum (the law is that which is just) or ius quia iussum
(the law is that which is commanded)-is more than a mere etymo-
logical quibble. The Romans considered law the object of deliberate
legislative action; an expression of the will of the people, or of
the Emperor to whom the original power of the people had been
transferred, but the extension of Roman dominion over the entire
known world at that time forced the Roman praetors'08 to interpret
and administer the laws of other nations and cultures. In the process,
they recognized certain universal and eternal principles of equity
and justice common to all legal systems and called them ius gentium
-the law of peoples or world law, based upon reason and an innate
sense of right and justice common to all human races.
105. Victor John Yannacone, Jr., "Environmental Legislation and Political Reality,
Leadership '70," Before the 1969 Midwinter Republican Governors' Conference at Hot
Springs, Arkansas, December, 1969.
106. Angelo J. Cerchione, With Sherman on the Brandywine, (Dept. of Landscape Arch.
& Reg. Plan., University of Pennsylvania, Dec. 1970). See also Cerchione & Black, Plan-
ning: A Communications Process, I PLAN., EN RoN. Sci. AVIAT. (Proceeding of the A.B.A.
Nat. Inst. on Environ. Litigation, Chicago 1974).
107. See L. COLUMELLA, DE RE RusSTIcA (trans. by H. Ash, E. Forster & E. Heffner
1954) ; A. Taormina, Journey Down a Roman Road, in THE CONSERVATIONIST 5 (Aug.-Sept.,
1969).
108. Although magistrates in Rome exercise both judicial authority (jurisdiction) and
administrative power (imperium), most of the judicial work was entrusted to the praetors
who came in time to exercise what we today would recognize as equitable Jurisdiction:
determining in what cases the strict positive law should be modified by principles of
natural justice (natudalis aequitas).
After Rome had extended its dominion over the entire then known world, it became neces-
sary for the pro-praetor in each subject territory, and the praetor peregrinus in Rome to
Interpret and administer the laws of other lands. Eventually they came to recognize cer-
tain universal and eternal principles of equity and justice common to all legal systems and
referred to these as the jus gentium: the law of peoples or world law, based upon that
reason and innate sense of right and justice common to all human beings and all races.
It seems probable that the jus gentium had its origin in the jus naturale, a philosophical
or ethical term, not a technical legal term, and the Roman equivalent of the universal
-law of Aristotle. I ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 10, 13. See J. SALMOND, JURIsPRUDENCE 29 (7th
ed. 1924).
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According to Cicero, it was Greek Stoicism which furnished the
philosophical basis for the ius gentium that so profoundly influenced
the jurisprudence of the Roman Empire. At the core of Greek Sto-
icism was ethics. The Stoics believed that there were empirical
standards of truth and justice which could be determined by man
through reason according to the nature of humanity. The Stoics
thought that human beings had an inborn notion of right and wrong
and that law in its essence rests not upon the arbitrary will of a
ruler or the emotional decree of the multitude, but upon the immut-
able, orderly structure of nature and the innate aspects of human
morality.2°9
The Stoic ethical teaching was that mankind should live in har-
mony with human nature according to the rational nature of man
in obedience to universal law.
The general and universal precepts of the natural law are a
fundamental law, a law of laws, which originates in the nature of
humanity and should always be the rational, social and moral norm
or standard of positive law if law is to be:
the bond which secures our privileges in the commonwealth,
the foundation of our liberty, and the fountainhead of justice.
Within the law are reposed the mind and heart, the judg-
ment and the conviction of the state. The state without law
would be like the human body without a mind-unable to em-
ploy the parts which are to it as sinews, blood, and limbs.
The magistrates who administer the law, the judges who in-
terpret it-all of us in short-obey the law to the end that
we may be free.1 0
Much of the difficulty in recognizing the natural law as an ac-
ceptable element of Anglo-American jurisprudence can be attributed
to the rise of logical positivism as a philosophical system during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The positivists insisted that
109. If justice is defined as all forms of rightful action, then we may distinguish at
least two forms of justice. Natural justice which is the idea of justice as it is, in truth,
and positive justice which is that conceived, recognized and expressed, more or less in-
completely, inaccurately and Imperfectly, by civil authority in the form of legislated or
mandated positive law. The term "positive" in this sense means established by some form
of human authority.
This distinction between natural and positive justice, together with the corresponding and
derivative distinction between natural and positive law, comes to us from Greek philos-
ophy. The Greeks considered the natural law as a body of imperative rules imposed on
mankind by Nature, the personified universe. The Stoics thought of Nature or the Uni-
verse as a living organism of which the material world was the body and of which the
Deity or the Universal Rational Force was the animating and ruling soul. To the Stoics,
the natural law was the rule of conduct laid down by the Universal Reason for the direc-
tion of mankind.
It seems that the time has come to reconsider some of the fundamental concepts of
philosophy which have influenced the legal tradition of Western Civilization, but often
without notice or reference. A good place to start might be HooxxE, OF THE LAWS OF
EccLEsIASTICAL POLI Y (1960), and the early struggle to harmonize the inconsistencies of
nationalism, constitutionalism, and the rights of man under the natural law.
110. Cicero's oration, In Defense of Cluentius, quoted in Wilkin, Cicero and the Late oj
Nature, in OaiGiNs OF THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 21 (A. Harding ed. 1954).
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the only source of human rights was positive law, and that the
positive law was independent of any natural law or universal law
influence.1'
Positivism continued to dominate the philosophy of law until the
end of World War II. In 1932, Radbruch provided the philosophical
support for the position that the judge and jurist must disregard
their sense of justice and obey the command of the law as written
by the state.11 2 Thus instructed, the jurists of Nazi Germany estab-
lished the Third Reich. The theoretical powerlessness of the German
judiciary to resist the implementation of unjust laws made those
judges the agent for the imposition of such policies.118
The same Radbruch whose writings and teachings left German
jurists powerless before Hitler's laws, in 1947, wrote:
The traditional conception of the law, [t]he positivism that
for decades . . . dominated German jurists, and its teaching
that 'the law is the law' were defenseless and powerless in
the face of such an injustice [the Holocost] clothed in the
form of the law. The followers of [judicial positivism] were
forced to recognize as 'just' (Recht) even that iniquitous law.
The science of the law must again reflect upon the milen-
nial common wisdom of Antiquity, the Christian Middle Ages,
and the Age of Illumination that there exists a higher jus-
tice (Recht) than [positive law] a natural law, a divine
law, a law of reason-briefly, a justice (Recht) that tran-
scends the [positive] law. As measured [against] this
higher justice, injustice (Unrecht) remains injustice, even
when it is given in the form of a law. Before this higher
justice also the judgment pronounced on the basis of such an
unjust law is not the administration of justice but rather in-
justice. 14
It appears that legal positivism, as a justification for ignoring the
natural law, was a hypothesis wrecked by the gruesome reality of
history.
111. The positivist view of law leaves no room for equity, much less a true philosophy of
law which must concern itself with right, wrong, justice and injustice. For if, as the legal
positivists contend, Just or unjust are Identical with what is permitted or forbidden by
positive law, there remains no room for any consideration of the philosophy of law, since
It has all been stated by the positive law of the moment in any particular state or princl-
pality. Kelsen, who spent most of his life attempting to "purify" the law from an con-
siderations of justice, or injustice, Or whether a particular law might be good or bad, sum-
marily dismissed those concerned with such questions by accusing them of making value
judgments, pursuing politics and succumbing to the evils of subjectivism. So successful was
Kelsen in convincing legal scholars, jurists and leaders of the American Corporation Bar
that law can be an "objective science" only by abstaining from consideration of funda-
mental questions of justice and injustice, morality, ethics, right and wrong, that eventually
the leadership of the Corporate Bar, Big Business, and the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government became inexplorably inter-twined without hinderance of any moral scruples so
long as the letter of the positive law was not violated. This unholy alliance culminated in
national crisis of conscience and confidence in America ,luring 1974.
112. W. uIuPEiN, PENOMENOLOGY Os NATURAL LAW 27 (1967).
113. Id.
114. G. Radbruch, Die Wandlung, in i DiE ERNEUERUNG DES REC-TS 9-10 (1947).
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VT. CONCLUSION
Judicial protection of that unique and irreplaceable national, na-
tural resource treasure-the limited supply of prime agricultural land
in the United States-depends upon recognition by our courts of
equity of that law, not always written, but born within us, which
we have taken, absorbed and imbibed from nature. A true law, a
natural law, a law which is in accordance with nature and with
the nature of humanity. A law which applies to all mankind and
is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands to husband all the
lands upon which the human species depends for food, this natural
law summons all landowners to fulfill their duties to the family of
man. To annul such a law of nature is impossible. To attempt
its invalidation by human legislation is morally reprehensible, and
to restrict its operations as a result of judicial insensitivity is a
crime against humanity.115
The fundamental right of the American people to judicial pro-
tection of the productivity of the prime agricultural lands of the
United States is one of those unenumerated rights "so basic and
important to our society that it would be inconceivable that it is
not protected from unwarranted interference." '116 It ;is the duty of
our courts of equity to protect 'such rights retained by the sovereign
people of the United States under the ninth amendment"7T from
U'whatever quarter... the greatest danger lies." 1 8 "It is the solemn
responsibility of the judiciary to 'fashion a remedy' for the violation
of a right which is truly 'inalienable' in the event that no remedy
has been provided by legislative enactment."" 9 An inherent human
right to protection of the ultimate source of our nation's food supply,
the land on which it is grown can be judicially protected "against
action by any person or department of government which would de-
stroy such a right... ,."120 As hunger stalks even our United States,
there can be no more fundamental human right entitled to consti-
tutional protection than the right to a share in the natural abundance
of our land.
Natural rights-inherent rights and liberties, are not the crea-
tures of constitutional provisions either at the national or state level.
The inherent human freedoms with which mankind is endowed are
"antecedent to all early government. . . rights derived from the
115. CIcERo, DE RE PUBLICA III. II. (C.W. Keyes transl. 1938).
116. United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 227 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
117. For an extensive general discussion of the ninth amendment, see 1 ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 19, at § 3.
118. J. MADISON, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS.
119. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 245, 880 P.2d 34, 40
(1962), rehearing denied April 8, 1963.
120. Id.
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great legislator of the Universe."' 12' Freedom from want and freedom
from hunger are such inherent human rights as to cry out to Heaven
for equitable protection.
Historically, 1 22 the ninth amendment was included in the Bill of
Rights to nullify the argument that the enumerated rights set forth
in the preceding eight amendments were intended to be the only
rights protected. To deny the ninth amendment as a source of sub-
stantive rights is to accept the argument it was adopted to nullify.
The ninth amendment is the reservoir of personal rights necessary
to preserve the existence and dignity of human beings in a free
society.
123
"So use your own property as not to injure another" is more
than an equitable maxim where the property is the priceless heri-
tage of those arable soils from which this nation grew to greatness,
and upon which this generation and those generations yet unborn
depend. It is a precept of the natural law124 binding at all times
upon all peoples, eternal and unchangeable promulgated by the one
common ruler of all mankind, who is the author of this law, its
interpreter and its sponsor.
121. 3 WORKS Op ADAMs: 440 (C. Adams ed. 1852).
122. THE DESATzS IN THE FEDERAL CONvmN'ON OF 1787, at 691 (G. Hunt & J. Scott ed. 1920).
123. State of Abellano, 50 HAWAII 384, 389-96, 441 P.2d 333, 335-89. (Levinso, J., con-
curring 1968).
124. "The unerring law is right reason; not an ordinance made by this or that mortal, a
corruptible and perishable law, a lifeless law written on lifeless parchment, or engraved on
lifeless columns; but one imperishable, and Impressed by Immortal Nature on the Immor-
tal mind." P. JUDAEus, WORKS III, 516. "Natural law is a divine law, written in the hearts
of all men, obliging them to do those things which are necessarily consonant to the ra-
tional nature of mandkind, and to refrain from those things which are repugnant to it."
C. THOMASIUS, INST. JuRiSp. DIv. I. 2, 97, quoted in J. SALMOND, JuRISPRuDENcm, 28-9
(7th ed. 1924).

